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Non-­‐technical	  summary	  
Awards	  increase	  in	  popularity	  in	  the	  corporate	  sector	  where	  managers	  consider	  innovative	  human	  
resource	  practices	  such	  as	  awards	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  firm	  competitiveness.	  The	  prevalence	  and	  
popularity	  of	  awards	  in	  the	  corporate	  sector	  suggest	  that	  awards	  fulfill	  important	  functions	  in	  
principal-­‐agent	  relationships.	  However,	  what	  exactly	  are	  awards,	  and	  in	  what	  respects	  do	  they	  differ	  
from	  other	  kinds	  of	  incentives	  studied	  in	  the	  economic	  literature?	  In	  award	  schemes,	  an	  agent	  is	  
given	  a	  symbolic	  reward	  for	  good	  performance	  in	  combination	  with	  positive	  performance	  feedback	  
and	  social	  recognition	  from	  superiors	  and	  peers.	  Although	  awards	  contain	  features	  of	  other	  
motivators,	  such	  as	  performance	  bonuses,	  pure	  feedback,	  gifts,	  praise,	  and	  tournament	  prizes,	  they	  
can	  be	  clearly	  distinguished	  from	  these	  other	  motivators.	  To	  date,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  evidence	  on	  the	  
effect	  of	  awards	  on	  performance.	  	  
This	  paper	  identifies	  the	  effect	  of	  receiving	  an	  award	  on	  subsequent	  employee	  performance	  in	  the	  
call	  center	  of	  a	  Fortune	  500	  financial	  services	  provider.	  	  Our	  data	  set	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  the	  awards	  
studied	  are	  not	  driven	  by	  the	  outcome	  measure	  that	  we	  look	  at.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  awards	  are	  directed	  
towards	  valuable	  activities	  such	  as	  substituting	  for	  colleagues	  or	  making	  improvement	  suggestions,	  
which	  are	  uncorrelated	  with	  the	  variation	  of	  the	  recorded	  performance	  in	  core	  call	  center	  activities	  
such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  calls	  answered.	  	  
The	  effect	  of	  awards	  on	  subsequent	  performance	  is	  theoretically	  ambiguous	  a	  priori.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  awards	  provide	  no	  direct	  incentives	  to	  increase	  core	  performance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
performance	  might	  decrease,	  for	  example,	  because	  award	  winners	  rest	  on	  their	  laurels.	  Alternatively,	  
performance	  might	  increase	  sustainably	  when	  the	  award	  intensifies	  identity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  workers'	  
self-­‐images	  as	  job	  holders	  of	  the	  award-­‐winning	  employees	  with	  the	  company.	  The	  heightened	  
attention	  resting	  on	  award	  winners	  during	  the	  month	  of	  the	  award	  could	  also	  induce	  a	  temporary	  
improvement	  of	  call	  center	  performance	  that	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  honor.	  
Our	  analysis	  yields	  four	  main	  findings.	  	  First,	  we	  report	  a	  positive	  spillover	  effect	  from	  the	  rewarded	  
job	  dimension	  to	  another	  one	  that	  does	  not	  qualify	  for	  an	  award:	  the	  receipt	  of	  an	  award	  for	  social	  
activities	  like	  volunteering	  or	  making	  improvement	  suggestions	  causes	  a	  statistically	  significant	  and	  
sizeable	  increase	  in	  core	  call	  center	  performance.	  	  Second,	  we	  document	  an	  ex	  post	  effect	  of	  rewards	  
on	  subsequent	  performance.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  only	  look	  at	  ex	  ante	  incentive	  effects	  when	  
assessing	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  a	  reward.	  Third,	  we	  document	  the	  motivating	  power	  of	  non-­‐pecuniary	  
rewards.	  Fourth,	  the	  data	  allow	  us	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  hypotheses	  that	  could	  
theoretically	  explain	  the	  performance	  increase.	  The	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  driven	  by	  
those	  individuals	  who	  previously	  performed	  poorly	  and	  is	  reflected	  most	  clearly	  in	  dimensions	  of	  the	  
job	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  observe.	  This	  implies	  that	  a	  desire	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  honor	  or	  affective	  reactions	  
rather	  than	  more	  sustainable	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  employee	  identity	  is	  at	  work.	  Finally,	  we	  
can	  show	  that	  awards	  exhibit	  decreasing	  marginal	  impacts:	  	  the	  spillover	  effect	  is	  substantially	  larger	  
when	  agents	  win	  their	  first	  award	  than	  when	  they	  win	  further	  awards.	  	  	  
While	  the	  form	  the	  non-­‐material	  reward	  takes	  might	  be	  specific	  to	  this	  setting,	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  
results	  is	  of	  general	  interest.	  The	  fact	  that	  awards	  affect	  subsequent	  performance	  in	  a	  job	  dimension	  
that	  does	  not	  qualify	  for	  it	  indicates	  that	  social	  incentives	  might,	  more	  generally,	  be	  important	  for	  
solving	  agency	  problems.	  Awards	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  value	  in	  situations	  prone	  to	  multi-­‐tasking	  or	  
motivation	  crowding.	  This	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  how	  workers	  respond	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  
non-­‐material	  work	  incentives	  and	  sheds	  light	  on	  how	  compensation	  schemes	  can	  be	  enriched	  with	  
non-­‐material	  components	  like	  awards.	  	  	  
Das	  Wichtigste	  in	  Kürze	  
Auszeichnungen	  sind	  ein	  in	  der	  Unternehmenspraxis	  weit	  verbreitetes	  Instrument	  zur	  
Motivationssteigerung	  von	  Mitarbeitern.	  Ihre	  Verbreitung	  und	  Beliebtheit	  legt	  nahe,	  dass	  sie	  eine	  
wichtige	  Funktion	  in	  der	  Firma	  haben.	  Was	  genau	  sind	  Auszeichnungen	  und	  in	  welcher	  Hinsicht	  
unterscheiden	  sie	  sich	  von	  anderen	  Anreizen?	  Bei	  einer	  Auszeichnung	  erhält	  ein	  Mitarbeiter	  eine	  
symbolische	  Belohnung	  für	  gute	  Leistung	  in	  Kombination	  mit	  positivem	  Leistungsfeedback	  und	  
sozialer	  Anerkennung	  von	  den	  Vorgesetzten	  und	  Kollegen.	  Auszeichnungen	  enthalten	  Elemente	  von	  
anderen	  Anreizen	  wie	  Leistungsboni,	  Feedback,	  Geschenken,	  Lob	  und	  Turnierpreisen.	  Dennoch	  
können	  sie	  ganz	  klar	  von	  diesen	  Motivatoren	  unterschieden	  werden.	  
Bisher	  gib	  es	  wenig	  verlässliche	  Studien,	  die	  analysieren,	  wie	  sich	  Auszeichnung	  auf	  die	  Leistung	  der	  
Mitarbeiter	  auswirken.	  Insbesondere	  ist	  unklar,	  wie	  sich	  die	  Gewinner	  und	  Nichtgewinner	  im	  
Anschluss	  an	  die	  Vergabe	  verhalten.	  Die	  Auswirkung	  von	  Auszeichnungen	  auf	  Gewinner	  ist	  aus	  
theoretischer	  Sicht	  a	  priori	  unklar.	  Auf	  der	  einen	  Seite	  könnte	  die	  Leistung	  nach	  Auszeichnungserhalt	  
sinken,	  wenn	  sich	  die	  Gewinner	  auf	  ihren	  Lorbeeren	  ausruhen.	  Auf	  der	  anderen	  Seite,	  könnte	  die	  
Leistung	  steigen,	  falls	  die	  Auszeichnung	  die	  Motivation	  und	  die	  Identifizierung	  mit	  der	  Firma	  
verstärkt.	  Gleichermaßen	  könnten	  Nichtgewinnern	  angespornt	  oder	  frustriert	  werden.	  	  
Diese	  Arbeit	  füllt	  diese	  Forschungslücke.	  Mittels	  Daten	  aus	  einem	  Call	  Center	  eines	  Fortune	  500-­‐
Finanzdienstleisters	  zeigen	  wir,	  dass	  Auszeichnungen	  die	  nachfolgende	  Leistung	  der	  Empfänger	  
signifikant	  erhöhen.	  Dies	  trifft	  vor	  allem	  auf	  solche	  Gewinner	  zu,	  die	  im	  Durchschnitt	  eher	  weniger	  
gut	  Leistung	  erbringen.	  Nichtgewinner	  verändern	  ihre	  Leistung	  nicht.	  Die	  Daten	  zeigen	  damit,	  dass	  
nicht-­‐finanzielle	  Belohnungen	  einen	  signifikanten	  und	  substantiellen	  Einfluss	  auf	  die	  nachfolgende	  
Arbeitsleistung	  haben.	  Außerdem	  wirken	  Belohnungen	  sich	  auch	  nach	  der	  Vergabe	  noch	  auf	  das	  
Verhalten	  aus.	  	  
Diese	  Ergebnisse	  haben	  Implikationen	  für	  die	  optimale	  Ausgestaltung	  von	  Anreizsystemen.	  Sie	  zeigen	  
einerseits,	  dass	  nichtfinanzielle	  Belohnungen	  wie	  Auszeichnungen	  für	  Unternehmen	  ein	  gutes	  
Instrument	  sind,	  um	  die	  Mitarbeiter	  zu	  höheren	  Leistungen	  anzuspornen.	  Zum	  anderen	  
dokumentieren	  wir,	  dass	  Belohnungen	  auch	  nach	  ihrer	  Vergabe	  auf	  die	  Leistung	  wirken.	  Zur	  
Evaluation	  der	  Wirkung	  eines	  Instruments	  muss	  also	  der	  ex	  ante	  Anreizeffekt	  wie	  auch	  der	  ex-­‐post	  
Effekt	  berücksichtigt	  werden.	  Außerdem	  wirken	  Auszeichnungen	  unterschiedlich	  auf	  
unterschiedliche	  Typen	  von	  Mitarbeitern.	  In	  unserem	  Fall	  reagierten	  vor	  allem	  die	  Mitarbeiter,	  die	  im	  
Schnitt	  unterdurchschnittliche	  Leistung	  erbringen.	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Abstract
Social incentives like employee awards are widespread in the corporate sector and may be
important instruments for solving agency problems. To date, we have little understanding
of their effect on behavior. Unique panel data from the call center of a Fortune 500 finan-
cial services provider allow us to estimate the impact of awards on performance. Winning
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performance. The effect is short-lived, mainly driven by underperforming agents, and is re-
flected mostly in dimensions of the job that are hard to observe. We discuss various theories
that could explain the effect.
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1 Introduction
Awards increase in popularity in the corporate sector where managers consider innovative hu-
man resource practices such as awards to be essential for firm competitiveness (Ichniowski
and Shaw 2003). In his book 1001 Ways to Reward Employees, Nelson (2005) provides ample
evidence of the number and variety of awards in companies. The prevalence and popularity
of awards in the corporate sector suggest that awards fulfill important functions in principal-
agent relationships.1 However, what exactly are awards, and in what respects do they differ
from other kinds of incentives studied in the economic literature? In award schemes, an agent
is given a symbolic reward for good performance in combination with positive performance
feedback and social recognition from superiors and peers. Often awards are accompanied by
some modest monetary prize. Although awards contain features of other motivators, such as
performance bonuses, pure feedback, gifts, praise, and tournament prizes, they can be clearly
distinguished from these other motivators. To date, there is very little evidence on the effect of
awards on performance.2
This paper identifies the effect of receiving an award on subsequent employee performance
in the call center of a Fortune 500 financial services provider. Our data set is unique in that the
awards studied are not driven by the outcome measure that we look at. Specifically, the awards
are directed towards valuable activities such as substituting for colleagues or making improve-
ment suggestions, which are uncorrelated with the variation of the recorded performance in
1There is a major discrepancy between the practitioner literature and the academic literature with respect to
recognition programs like awards. On the one hand, the practitioner literature frequently advocates recognition
programs to improve safety ( Pardy 1999), reduce turnover (Davidson 1999; Wallsten 1998), increase job satis-
faction (Davidson 1999), improve performance and productivity (Schneier 1989), and reduce absenteeism (Boyle
1995). Furthermore, numerous books and manuals have been written detailing how to structure recognition pro-
grams (Townsend and Gebhardt 1997; Glassock and Gram 1999; Ventrice 2003; Podmoroff 2005). On the other
hand, there is a paucity of academic research targeted at recognition programs. This disparity is probably driven by
the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes a corporate award system from an academic point of view. When
practitioners discuss recognition programs, they refer to a variety of interventions that represent incentive instru-
ments designed to reward at a low cost. From an academic point of view, this represents an ambiguous concept with
little theoretical basis, which is why academic research has focused on studying money, praise, and feedback in iso-
lation. Despite these concerns, we consider the study of awards worthwhile given their prevalence in the corporate
sector, where they are used as instruments to induce effort in addition to monetary compensation schemes.
2Previously, when economists studied incentives in organizations, the focus was on incentives in the form of
monetary payments in exchange for performance in specific, measurable dimensions. This is illustrated by the
large literature on incentive pay to align the interests of principal and agent starting with the pioneering works by
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Potential problems with performance pay have been
acknowledged and analyzed. One example is the discussion of multi-tasking problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom
1991). Starting with Lazear and Rosen (1981), the analysis of work incentives in the form of tournaments has
been a popular field of study. Another popular thread of literature that is important for studying awards is the
literature on signaling (Spence 1973, 1974). Prendergast (1999) provides an overview of the economic literature
on the provision of incentives in firms. This study complements the traditional economic analysis with respect
to non-material incentives, ex-post effects of rewards, rewards for vague performances such as volunteering, and
spillover effects of rewards for good performance in one job dimension to performance in another.
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core call center activities such as the number of calls answered. We test and corroborate this
feature of the data and conclude that core performance does in fact not have predictive power
for the receipt of an award. Hence, this feature of the award system can be used as an exoge-
nous source of variation, which allows us to make causal inference about the effect of awards
on performance. Moreover, it allows us to address how an award for one type of behavior spills
over to another type of behavior.
The effect of awards on subsequent performance is theoretically ambiguous a priori. On
the one hand, core performance might be unaffected because the awards recognize activities
that are not related with performance. For the same reason, increasing core performance does
not increase the likelihood of winning the award again. Hence, the awards provide no direct
incentives to increase core performance. On the other hand, performance might decrease, for
example, because award winners rest on their laurels.3 Alternatively, performance might in-
crease when the award intensifies workers’ identification with the company (Akerlof and Kran-
ton 2005) or causes them to respond reciprocally in all dimensions of their job.4 The heightened
attention resting on award winners during the month of the award could induce a temporary
improvement of call center performance that is driven by a desire to live up to the honor or
by the positive emotions caused by receiving the award. Such mechanisms include self-image
concerns (Be´nabou and Tirole 2002), image motivation (Ariely et al. 2009), peer effects (Mas
and Moretti 2009), and mood effects ( Isen and Simmonds 1978).
Our analysis yields four main findings. First, we document that rewards affect performance
ex post and not only ex ante (incentive effect). Second, we document the motivating power
of one particular kind of rewards: employee awards. While economists have a good under-
standing of why and how financial rewards affect performance, we are still at the beginning of
understanding the motivating power of other kinds of rewards, such as awards, and this paper
addresses this research gap. Third, we report a positive spillover effect from the rewarded job
dimension to another one that does not qualify for an award: the receipt of an award for social
activities like volunteering or making improvement suggestions causes a statistically significant
and sizeable increase in core call center performance. This result is robust to alternative specifi-
cations that check the validity of the identifying assumption and a variety of robustness checks.
This suggests that awards are meaningful for employee motivation, which in turn influences job
performance generally. The results also show that those spillover effects are short-lived. Thus,
awards are motivators that can serve as valuable instruments in principal-agent relationships.
Nevertheless, managers will not be able to use awards in one dimension as a primary motivator
3Malmendier and Tate (2009) show that CEOs who win titles like “CEO of the Year” subsequently underper-
form both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs.
4See Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 and Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000 and Gneezy
and List 2006 provide surveys on lab and field experimental evidence.
3
for effort in another dimension. Fourth, the data allow us to distinguish between different hy-
potheses that could theoretically explain the performance increase. The analysis suggests that
the effect is driven by those individuals who previously performed poorly and is reflected most
clearly in dimensions of the job that are hard to observe. This implies that a desire to live up to
the honor or affective reactions rather than more sustainable mechanisms such as a shift in em-
ployee identity are at work. Further, the results are hard to reconcile with direct peer pressure or
mechanisms that apply to both under- and overperforming winners at the same time. Finally, we
can show that awards exhibit decreasing marginal impacts: the spillover effect is substantially
larger when agents win their first award than when they win further awards.
Transitory ex-post effects of material rewards have been documented in the gift-exchange
literature (see, e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000 and Gneezy and List 2006). This study complements
previous research in this field with a focus on non-material rewards. Our finding of the posi-
tive spillover effect of an award for social activities on core performance adds to the literature
on motivation crowding out and multi-tasking that mainly focuses on negative spillovers. This
study extends the study of work incentives, which have predominantly analyzed simple tasks
(Prendergast 1999), to a task that is characterized by many different job dimensions. Addition-
ally, the significant behavioral effect of these social incentives also fits well into the current
discussion on the disparity between the impact of monetary incentives in the lab and in the
field. While lab studies find a large behavioral effect of wage increases, effort reacts relatively
little in the field. Some authors (see, e.g., Dur 2008) argue that this divergence is caused by the
fact that employers in the field typically use motivators other than wages, e.g. recognition, to
signal kind intentions. Therefore, employees do not reciprocate wage increases in the field to
the extent they do in the lab, where money is the only means of signaling kind intentions.
While the form the non-material reward takes might be specific to this setting, the essence
of the results is of general interest. The fact that awards affect subsequent performance in a job
dimension that does not qualify for it indicates that social incentives might, more generally, be
important for solving agency problems. Awards may be of particular value in situations prone to
multi-tasking or motivation crowding. This has important implications for how workers respond
to the provision of non-material work incentives and sheds light on how compensation schemes
can be enriched with non-material components like awards.
To our knowledge, there are only few papers so far that explicity study awards. Hansen
and Weisbrod (1972) and Frey (2005) address awards as incentives in general. Markham et al.
(2002) show in a quasi-experimental setting that the introduction of a public recognition pro-
gram to reduce absenteeism decreases the latter by 52 percent. Moldovanu et al. (2007) study
the optimal design of status categories in organizations, assuming that agents care about their
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relative positions. Gavrila et al. (2005) describe the optimal solution for the management of
awards over time, considering that their incentive effect depends on the number of awards that
are presented. Besley and Ghatak (2008) analyze a principal-agent setting with status incen-
tives, such as job titles or awards. The decisive feature of these rewards is that they have zero
marginal costs, so it is incentive-compatible for the principal to award them even if the payoff
is not verifiable. Neckermann and Frey (2008) and Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) show that
awards act as incentives, significantly influencing performance before they are presented. Mal-
mendier and Tate (2009) show how the receipt of a title like CEO of the Year affects subsequent
performance. However, their paper is concerned with extra-organizational awards that differ in
essential ways from intra-organizational awards as the bestower is not part of the organization,
i.e. of the central principal-agent relationship.5
Section 2 presents the data and the estimation technique. In Section 3, the empirical findings
are discussed, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
The data set comprises information on awards as well as the employee performance of the 155
call center agents of a credit card service company of a Fortune 500 financial services provider
and covers the period from January 2004 to October 2007. The call center is responsible for
handling customer complaints and questions and consists of six workgroups, one supervisor
each.
2.1 The Performance Measure
The company records daily performance for a number of different performance dimensions,
starting in the second month of employment. On a monthly and yearly basis, these measures are
transformed into rankings and aggregated into a single performance index. In particular, for each
dimension, the percentage deviation between individual performance and the average monthly
performance of all call center agents is calculated and transformed into a rating between 5
(very good) and 1 (unsatisfactory), according to a matrix set up by the head of department. As
an example, an agent who performs 120 percent of the average performance in a dimension
receives a rating of 5 in that dimension, and an agent whose performance is 80 percent or lower
receives a rating of 1. On a monthly basis, employees are informed via email about their rating
5There are related branches of literature in organizational psychology and management. Stajkovic and Luthans
(2003) provide an overview of the organizational behavior literature. However, there is a general paucity of empir-
ical evidence, specifically on measured rather than stated behavior.
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and about how it compares to the average performance in the call center. The company refers to
the performance measure for the semi-anual appraisal interview and for decisions about layoffs.
The relative nature of the performance measurement is an advantage for our study because
it is unaffected by all time-varying factors that affect the absolute performance of all call center
agents at the same time. In our setting, absolute performance does not exhibit a systematic trend,
and average performance typically changes only very little between two months in all dimen-
sions. Any change in absolute performance that we observe might reflect changes in working
conditions that should be filtered out. Specifically, the ranking is not affected by an increase
in the number or difficulty of calls or by improvements in the technical infrastructure. Both of
these factors render absolute performance incomparable over time. The relative rating further
ensures that a certain number of calls answered translates into a higher rating in slow rather than
in busy months. We use the same index as the company to ensure that our performance mea-
sure corresponds to the company’s assessment of performance. Because the company alters the
exact calculation of its performance index from time to time by adding and removing different
performance dimensions from it, a core performance measure was constructed in collaboration
with the call center manager. The performance index comprises the following six dimensions
that have been part of the company’s index in all of the periods covered:6
1. Calls Taken Per Hour: Average number of phone calls handled per hour.
2. Call Handling Time: Average length of phone call.
3. After Call Worktime: Average amount of time needed to process the request after the call
has been ended.
4. Transfer Rate: The average ratio between calls handled by the employee and the number
of phone calls that were transferred to colleagues or other service units.
5. Lates: Number of days on which the employee showed up late for work.
6. Quality: Quality of client handling is assessed both externally and internally.7
6The company’s changes in the index do not reflect systematic and sustained improvements of performance
evaluation, which would have suggested us to use the changing index, too. Rather, all dimensions that are not cap-
tured in our core rating were added and removed at various instances. Examples are the two dimensions Training,
which measures an employee’s performance in in-house training courses, and Write-off Policy, which measures the
degree to which employees follow company guidelines on goodwill issues. Both dimensions were in the company’s
index only in 2006.
7The external and the internal component of the rating each account for 50 percent of the quality rating. Internal
quality is assessed by a supervisor who periodically monitors conversations of each agent. The assessment follows
a clear set of rules and guidelines that leave virtually no room for subjectivity. Evaluation criteria are, for example,
whether the agents correctly introduce themselves and ask the correct set of questions in the prescribed order. The
external quality rating is generated by an outside company that conducts surveys with the company’s customers.
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Of these dimensions, only the dimension Lates is not evaluated relatively but according to
an absolute scale (no absence corresponds to a rating of 4, one absence to a rating of 3, and
more than one absence to a rating of 1). The resulting six ratings are then combined to a single
overall rating, which provides an overall assessment of performance. It captures all the relevant
trade-offs the company faces, ensuring that employees do not improve their rating, for instance,
by answering more calls at the expense of a higher transfer rate. This renders the assessment
of performance via the index preferable to a study of the individual performance dimensions.
Quality enters with a weight of 50 percent and the five other dimensions with 10 percent each.
The weighting scheme suggests that the company places equal emphasis on technical measures,
such as the number and durations of calls, and content measures, which capture the actual
interaction between employee and customer. Figure I exhibits the distribution of performance
ratings.
[Figure I ABOUT HERE]
The performance ratings are approximately normally distributed with an average of 3.02 and
a standard deviation of 0.66 and do not exhibit a time trend. The mean and variation corroborate
the objective, quantitative nature of our performance data, as subjectively determined evaluation
data typically cluster around high values (on the leniency bias see, e.g., Murphy and Cleveland
1995; Yariv 2006) and may cause endogeneity problems because managers might assess award-
receiving individuals more favorably.
2.2 The Awards
While the company offers a multitude of different awards to its employees, only the Gold Re-
ward is relevant for the call center agents. The Gold Reward remunerates exceptional efforts that
benefit the entire work group. Examples of behaviors that qualify for a Gold Reward are volun-
teering as a substitute during vacation times, initiating and implementing team events, making
improvement suggestions, and helping others with good advice. The company encourages em-
ployees to engage in these activities because they are important for its efficient functioning.
Nominations can be made by colleagues as well as supervisors. About half of the nominations
come from group supervisors and the other half from colleagues. The reasons provided for the
nominations do not differ systematically between the two. The Human Resources Department
communicates the criteria for nominations well; thus, almost all nominations result in an award.
Interviews with group supervisors and employees further suggest that everyone who deserves
an award receives one. This is guaranteed by the fact that so many individuals can nominate, and
a close connection between effort and likelihood of nomination is ensured. Hence, individuals
can actively pursue winning an award. An award is presented by the call center manager in front
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of the worker’s colleagues in the middle of the following month. Award winners, as well as their
colleagues, only learn about the award at that ceremony. There is no additional announcement of
the award winners; however, the management tries to present the award when many colleagues
are present. The award is accompanied by a certificate for the wall, which serves as a reminder
and ensures that agents not present at the ceremony learn about it. Further, it comes with a
small bonus of around $ 150, which equals about 3 percent of monthly income. Importantly,
awards are not presented for the performance used as the dependent variable in our analysis.
In fact, core performance has nothing to do with the activities that lead to an award. Therefore,
the effect of an award on core performance can be identified by comparing the performance
of winners and nonrecipients subsequent to winning. If awards depended on performance, they
would always be—at least in part—a reflection of good performance, and a careful creation of
control groups would be necessary to identify the causal effect.
The call center agents are paid a fixed monthly wage of CHF 4,500 (about $4,500). The exact
sum the individual receives depends on their level of experience, knowledge of languages, and
length of employment at the call center. The Gold Reward complements the company’s salary
scheme because it incentivizes activities such as substituting for colleagues or organizing team
events that are not part of an agent’s job description. The management asserted that receiving
a Gold Reward had no effect on future promotion decisions and that award winners did not
receive special attention, training, or other advantages, for which we cannot control.
The award sytem of the company has been in place since 2001. Therefore, we cannot es-
timate how the presence of the award system per se changes performance because there is no
control group without awards. Rather, this ex-ante incentive effect of awards is part of the base-
line motivation of each employee and constant throughout the period of our study.8
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
The data set covers 46 months from January 2004 to October 2007. Each month, the employees
had the opportunity to win Gold Rewards (Gold Reward January 2004 to Gold Reward October
2007). The data set comprises a total of 1408 individual-month observations. In total we observe
150 individuals and 137 Gold Rewards. As expected, the distribution is skewed to the right.
One agent received a total of eight Gold Rewards, whereas 75 received none.9 These numbers
suggest that the award is sufficiently scarce for it to be valuable to its recipients, and the sample
8This incentive effect potentially changes with winning an award. One might argue that the motivation to
win decreases once an award has been won. However, such a potential change in baseline motivation renders the
detection of a positive change in performance caused by the receipt of an award more difficult.
9Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows the entire frequency distribution of the number of Gold Rewards per em-
ployee.
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is well balanced between winners and nonrecipients because about half of the agents never
received an award. On average, 3.4 awards are presented per month with a minimum of zero
and a maximum of 11.
63 percent of the agents in the sample are female, and the average length of tenure at the
call center is 15.77 months. On average, three awards are handed out per month and about half
of all the men and women in the sample receive a Gold Reward (see Table I). The mean time
that elapses between two awards is 5 months.10 Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the number
of Gold Rewards for each month that we observe at the call center.
[TABLE I ABOUT HERE]
3 Awards and Performance
3.1 Empirical Specification
We estimate period-specific effects both before and after a Gold Reward is won. The absence of
any significant difference between the performance of winners and non-recipients prior to the
award supports our assumption that the probability of winning an award is decoupled from an
agent’s core performance. 11 Then, any divergence in performance subsequent to winning can
be interpreted as being caused by the award. We control for individual fixed effects to account
for individual difference in the level of core call center performance. The relative nature of our
performance measure implies that we identify the effect of winning an award via the change in
performance of the award-winning employees.
The following table presents an overview of the three dimensions used to identify and quan-
tify the effect of a Gold Reward on employee performance:
[TABLE II ABOUT HERE]
According to the identification strategy presented above, the causal effect of receiving an
award on employee performance is estimated by fitting the following equation to the data:
Yit = α +
T∑
τ=T
piτWiτ + µi + βXit + ξit. (1)
10On average, an agent receives their first Gold Reward after 14 months at the call center. The mean time elapsed
between first and second award is 7.6 months; further awards follow, on average, within less than 6 months.
11Gold Rewards are directed towards behaviors such as supporting colleagues and organizing team events that
are not captured in the core performance rating.
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The dependent variable Yit represents the performance rating of employee i in period t.
Because Yit is constructed as the weighted average of the ratings in the individual performance
dimensions discussed above, it takes on many different values and can be treated as continuous.
The index τ denotes the time period relative to t and is measured in months. τ runs from −6 to
+6 and is normalized so that τ = 0 refers to the current month t; τ < 0 refers to months prior
to t; τ > 0 refers to months after t. The range of τ determines the size of the event window.
The indicator variable µi controls nonparametrically for employee fixed effects, such as level
of education and gender.12 Because the resulting panel is unbalanced, we use dummy variables
rather than fixed effects as controls for individual-specific effects.Xit is a vector of time-varying
observable characteristics of the individual. In our case, this is the length of employment in the
call center and its squared term. α represents a constant, and ξit is a stochastic error term. To
calculate standard errors, we cluster on the workgroup level per year.13 Alternative ways of
adjusting standard errors are discussed below.
The key variables in this regression are theWiτ indicator variables.Wiτ equals one for a per-
son i who receives a Gold Reward τ periods from the current period t, and zero otherwise. As
the Gold Reward is open to all employees in all periods, Wiτ captures all the relevant infor-
mation because each employee is either a winner or a nonrecipient in each month. The vector
piτ are the parameters of interest in this equation and capture the period-specific effects on per-
formance of winning a Gold Reward τ months from the current time period t as compared to
not winning an award, conditional on all covariates. By including an indicator variable for each
period, the effect of being a winner is allowed to vary with τ . The time series of the coefficients
piτ around the event (τ = 0) allows us to detect the causal effect of an award on performance.
If the coefficients were significantly positive before the award was presented, there would be
concerns about reverse causality. In case the performance of winners and nonrecipients is in-
distinguishable prior to an award for a large number of periods, we can be confident that our
identifying assumption holds.
As all individuals are winners or nonrecipients with respect to multiple awards, every
performance observation simultaneously helps to identify all 13 different piτ from pi−6, the
performance of winners relative to nonrecipients six months prior to an award, to pi+6, the
12In principle, one could also control for time- and award-specific effects. However, the relative nature of our
performance measure already eliminates period-specific, exogenous shocks to performance. In addition, the Gold
Rewards in the individual months that we cover are identical, so there is no reason to expect independent award-
specific effects.
13We do not have obvious problems with grouped errors as the unit of observation corresponds with the unit of
variation, i.e. the award. However, clustering on workgroups accounts for possible correlations of ratings within
teams. As team composition varies between years due to employee fluctuation, workgroup-per-year clusters are
used. This also increases the number of clusters, which improves inference due to the asymptotic properties of the
clustering procedure (Kiefer 1980; White 1980).
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performance of winners relative to nonrecipients six months after an award.
[FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure II shows the data, ie. the average quarterly performance of winners and nonrecipients
around the award.14 The performance of winners has a higher standard error and varies more be-
cause there are fewer observations for the winners than for nonrecipients. Naturally, the average,
mean-corrected performance rating of the large number of nonrecipients centers around zero.
The illustration suggests that the performance of winners and nonrecipients is indistinguishable
prior to an award and that the performance of winners increases relative to nonrecipients in the
period following the award.
[FIGURE II ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Results
The regressions in Table III confirm that awards cause a statistically significant spillover effect
as winners substantially increase their core call center performance in the month following
the award. We control for individual fixed effects and length of employment and cluster on a
workgroup per year level in all regressions to account for any type of correlation within the
observations of each group.15 Table III presents the results. The first model includes all id-
months observations. The second model uses clean event windows. This means that only those
id-month observations are included where at most one of the winner dummies, Wiτ , equals one
to eliminate confounding effects of other awards received in the event window. According to
Model 1, the performance of winners is 0.15 higher than that of nonrecipients one month after
the award. Restricting the model to clean award windows increases the effect to 0.23, which is
equivalent to a performance increase by 7.4 percent or 0.36 standard deviations.16 This increase
is substantial, especially when taking into account the large number of Gold Reward winners
14The performance is corrected for individual fixed effects to ensure the comparability with the results of the
regressions presented below.
15As is the case in most event studies, our residuals exhibit positive serial correlation. The Huber-White sand-
wich estimates of variance we report correct for this. Moreover, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that, if the intervention
variable is not serially correlated, OLS standard errors are consistent, despite the positive serial correlation in the
residuals. This is true in this study. As a further robustness check, we used the two-way cluster approach (Cameron
et al. 2006), which provides cluster-robust inference when there is non-nested, two-way clustering. The two di-
mensions that we checked were id and month because one could imagine errors to be clustered for all observations
of one individual and within one month. The results are robust to this specification.
16As most individuals receive their second or third Gold Reward within one year after their first Gold Reward,
most of these repeated awards are lost when using clean event windows (see Table I). In the regressions that ensure
clean event windows, there are substantially less id-month observations for second, third and fourth awards as
repeated awards are ususally granted within the span of one year. Therefore, the increase of the coefficient between
Models 1 and 2 is a first indication that first awards have a bigger impact on performance than further ones. This
issue will be discussed and tested in more detail below.
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at the call center and that we use performance in a job dimension that is not incentivized with
the award as the dependent variable. Two months after the award, the difference in performance
becomes insignificant. One may be concerned that the particular construction of the index drives
our result. To check the robustness of our result, we constructed a different index that weights
all performance dimensions equally. The results are reported in Model 3, which confirms that
our results are not driven by the large weight of 50 percent of Quality in the company index.
The pattern of performance, both in terms of the size of coefficients and significance levels, is
similar to that in the other models presented.
[TABLE III ABOUT HERE]
Consistent with our homogeneity assumption, we find no significant difference in perfor-
mance ratings prior to an award conditional on the co-variates. In fact, the mean-adjusted per-
formance ratings are statistically indistinguishable for this relatively large number of periods.
The only exception is the performance 5 months prior to the award in Model 1.This can be ex-
plained by the fact that individuals receive a second award on average 5 months after their first
award. To exclude such confounding effects, the remainder of the discussion will be based on
the model specification with clean event windows. The long time series of insignificant coeffi-
cients prior to winning an award supports our identifying assumption that awards are not driven
by performance in core call center duties. As an additional robustness check, we ran probit
regressions of the likelihood of receiving an award on lagged performance levels, controlling
for tenure and its squared term, and do not find a statistically significant relationship. Only the
length of tenure has a significant impact, which provides an additional rationale for including
it in the regressions presented above.17 The control variable job tenure does not have a robust,
statistically significant effect on performance.
A closer look at performance in the individual performance dimensions (see Table IV )
shows that the overall result (i.e. the sizes of the coefficients and their significance levels) is
reflected in the Quality dimension and, to a lesser extent, in the dimension After Call Worktime.
Performance also increases in all other dimensions, but the effect size and the specific lags that
exhibit significant coefficients differ between dimensions and are not strong enough to have
a significant effect on the overall rating. However, these findings should be interpreted with
care because only the aggregate rating is a useful measure of performance due to the trade-offs
17Coefficients and standard errors on the first and second lag of performance are -0.10 (s.e. 0.11) and -0.11 (s.e.
0.11), respectively. There is also no indication for an Ashenfelter Dip here because the award is independent of
the performance in core call center tasks (Ashenfelter, 1978). Interestingly, the fixed effects of winners are, on
average, higher than that of agents who never receive an award. However, this seems to be a level effect that does
not compromise our analysis and findings. As an additional robustness check, we checked whether the likelihood
of receiving an award depended on lagged core call center performance for the different levels of the individual
fixed effect, which is not the case.
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between the different dimensions. Interestingly, agents respond most clearly in those dimen-
sions of the job that are hard to observe. In contrast to Number of Calls Taken or Transfer Rate,
Quality and After Call Worktime are hard to assess for colleagues and are also not immediately
visible to the team supervisor. This suggests that the performance increase is caused by some
intrinsic or affective mechanism rather than by peer pressure or image motivation.
[TABLE IV ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE V ABOUT HERE]
How sustainable is this effect? We have seen that the effect only lasts for the month follow-
ing the award, but can the company exploit this spillover effect by handing awards to agents
every now and then? Or do the awards lose power the more often a person receives them? To
approach this question, we split the sample into first-time and repeated winners (columns 1
– 3 of Table V). These models are estimated without clean event windows to retain ALL the
repeated winners in the sample. The first column repeats the baseline model from the main re-
gression table. The second model only retains those observations where individuals have one
award maximum. The third model drops all observations for first-time award winners, i.e. it
contains observations for individuals with zero or with two or more awards. As one can see,
the coefficient of winning the award is substantially larger for first-time award winners than
in the overall model (0.15 versus 0.24, which correspond to performance increases by 5 and 8
percent, respectively). Hence, repeated awards seem to be less powerful. This is confirmed in
column 3, which shows that repeated awards do not even have a statistically significant impact
on performance.18
Recipients may feel a need to live up to the honor of having received an award for their
voluntary work behaviors, and this may affect their core performance either for instrinsic self-
image reasons, affective reasons or because the increased exposure in the month of the award
induces pressure to improve core call center performance. We hypothesized that these mecha-
nisms might be more pronounced for individuals that previously underperformed. The data al-
low us to test this hypothesis by separating the winners into two groups: those individuals who
performed below average prior to winning and those who performed above average. To account
for mean reversion,19 we use the three periods preceeding an award to classify individuals as
18Unfortunately, we do not know the award history of individuals at the start of our observation period. Whenever
these individuals receive the first Gold Reward in our sample, this is counted as their “first” award. However, this
procedure only biases our estimate of first awards downwards as the Gold Reward received might in fact present a
repeated one.
19Individuals who achieved a very good performance rating have likely been lucky that month. Their next draws
from the performance distribution are unlikely to meet or exceed prior realizations, causing their individual perfor-
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high- or low-performing. Specifically, we look at τ = +2, τ = +1, and τ = 0. Individuals that
perform worse than average in two or three of those periods are classified as low performers.20
Columns 4 and 5 in Table V show that low-performing winners increase their rating statistically
significantly by 0.46 or 17.3 %, while the awards have no statistically significant impact on
the performance of the other call center agents. The average rating of high performers in the
month they win an award is 3.28 (std. dev. 0.57), which suggests that the performance of high
performers is not bounded from above, and they have the scope to increase their performance
the same as low performers.21 As was discussed above, some of the models without clean event
windows show statistically significant effects 5 or 6 months before the award that are due to the
fact that repeated awards are typically received five or six months after the first Gold Reward.
This differential impact suggests that the motivational channel at work affects over- and under-
performing winners differently, and, hence, that the theory to account for the spillover effect
that we detect needs to account for this.
Figure III illustrates that the documented increase in core performance is mainly caused by
the catching up of previously low-performing agents. The figure shows that all performance
ratings that were below 2.8 in the month prior to the award shift up and center around the
average performance.
[Figure III ABOUT HERE]
The results do not change with a variation in the event window size (we tested event win-
dows ranging from plus/minus 3 to 12 months). In addition, the inclusion of time fixed effects
has no effect on the results because the relative rating already eliminates any impact of time-
varying changes in the business environment (see column (6) in table V). Moreover, the same
result holds when we only look at agents at the beginning of their career at the call center. Then,
they have not had the time yet to establish a personal relationship with the supervisor, which
renders it unlikely that politicking or collusion with the supervisor play a role in determining
who wins and award. Finally, the inclusion of individual-specific linear time trends does not
affect the pattern of performance described above.
mance to revert to the population mean.
20This particular scheme was suggested to us by the management of the company. The results are robust to
alternative ways of catergorizing individuals.
21Also, there is no significant difference in the variance of performance ratings between the two samples.
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3.3 Discussion
We find that underperforming call center agents increase their core call center performance
subsequent to winning an award for exceptional efforts unrelated to core call center duties. The
effect is short-lived and most pronounced in tasks that are difficult to observe.
These findings are hard to reconcile with a number of established theories. One would, for
example, expect that the effect would have been more sustainable, had the award succeeded in
positively affecting employee identification with the company (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005).22
Psychological evidence also suggests that a positive event, which induces a good mood, in-
creases subsequent voluntary behavior when this is in line with the positive cognitions evoked
by the event ( Isen and Simmonds 1978). While this mechanism could explain an increase in the
behavior that lead to the award, it cannot explain an increase in core call center performance.
At the same time, receiving an award can also induce reciprocal actions (e.g., Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2000; Kube et al. 2008). The transitory effect that we find is in line with the evidence on
gift exchange literature (e.g., Gneezy and List 2006). According to reciprocity theories typically
used to explain these effects (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher
2006), winners increase their efforts to reciprocate to the monetary bonus or the value of the
gift associated with winning the Gold Reward. However, it is highly unlikely that the entire
effect we document is driven by reciprocity to the monetary value of the bonus or gift. The
amount is small – only 3 percent of the average monthly salary of around CHF 4,500 – and
field studies have shown that the wage elasticity of workers’ outputs ranges from roughly 0.15
to 0.44 (Fehr et al. 2008). Thus, the observed increase of 7.5 percent would require a wage
increase between 15 to 50 percent. This corresponds to a bonus of between CHF 750 and CHF
2,500, which is much higher than the actual amount of CHF 150. Any effect related to the agents
reciprocating to the social recognition value of the award is in line with our argumentation that
purely social rewards influence performance. However, the differentiated impact on under- and
overperforming winners is hard to reconcile with a standard reciprocity story where individuals
reciprocate to the honor of having received the award, which should apply to both types of
winners. One could, however, argue that underperforming agents might feel a stronger need to
“pay back” the recognition in terms of core performance than individuals that generally perform
well.
22(Akerlof and Kranton, 2005) state that employees who identify with their company perform better and that
employers can actively influence whether employees identify with the company. Specifically, initiation rites, such
as award ceremonies, can be used to change self-perception. Our evidence, however, suggests that a Gold Reward
does not cause a sustainable change in preferences (i.e., employee identity) because the effect is limited to the
month subsequent to winning.
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That underperformers react mainly in those dimensions of the job that are relatively unob-
servable, suggests that the mechanism might be intrinsic rather than an attempt to satisfy the
colleagues. Such behavior is consistent with models on self-image concerns and image moti-
vation (Ariely et al. 2009; Be´nabou and Tirole 2002), assuming that individuals feel bad about
themselves when being honored in one dimension of the job but performing insufficiently in
another. Moreover, the mere effect of being in the center of attention for the month of the
award might render agents more self-conscious so that they work harder in all dimensions of
the job. Again, this applies more to under- than to overperforming agents and might be related
to Hawthorne effects as discussed in the literature.23
Arguments explaining the observed effect without resorting to social motives are unlikely to
play a role here. The award system is well established, and the criteria are clear to all employees.
Therefore, handing out the award should not change the relevant information of the agents on
the type of behavior and the required effort level to win. 24 A Gold Reward has no impact
on future promotion decisions, and employees know that. Furthermore, a Gold Reward has no
value as a signal of ability and motivation. Managers and employees both confirmed that they
would not mention a Gold Reward in their CV. Any motive related to the agent trying to win
the award again also cannot explain the finding because any increase in core performance is by
definition of the award criteria not linked to a higher chance of winning another Gold Reward
because these reward activities are not captured in the core rating.
We can also rule out that the effect is caused by award winners focusing on those activities
that lead to the award at the expense of core performance prior to winning. If the argument
was true, the performance after the award would be the normal level of core performance, and
winners and nonrecipients would not be homogeneous despite the similarity of their perfor-
mance prior to the award. While such an effect could be imagined if one only looked at the
three months prior to an award—the maximum time span that an activity eligible for winning
lasts—the long time series of insignificant performance differences prior to an award renders
the conjecture invalid. In addition, the difference in performance after an award should then also
be sustained for more than one month. The same holds for the argument that utility is concave
in the number of awards won. Then, award-winning employees may substitute effort for award-
23Generally, the classic Hawthorne effect (Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; Levitt and List 2009
provide a recent critical assessment) cannot explain the documented impact of the award because both the treatment
and the control group are subject to the award system, which has been in place for several years. The data we use
were collected as part of normal business procedures prior to us contacting the organization. A wider interpretation
that refers to the potential motivating power of managerial and peer attention directed towards the winners is
consistent with our findings.
24Further, the small bonus of CHF 150 is unlikely to cause an income effect that could explain the result.
Moreover, if there was any income effect, it would affect performance in the opposite direction and only strengthen
the result that winning the award triggers employees to work harder.
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eligible activities by effort in core performance dimensions because they do not care as much
about winning another award. Employees being homogenous ex ante then simply reflects that
prior to the award everyone tries to win an award. Again, this argument is hard to reconcile with
the short-lived nature of the effect.
Regarding the size of the effect, it is worth observing that the sizes of the documented effects
only present a lower bound of the effect size of awards on preformance due to three reasons
specific to this study. First, the Gold Reward is low in the hierarchy of awards at the company,
and one would expect to find even larger effects for more important awards. Second, awards at
the company are presented for beneficial behaviors that are not included in the company’s core
performance measure, which we use as the dependent variable. Thus, the estimated effect of
awards on core performance presents only the spillover effect of the presumably larger effect
on those behaviors that are rewarded. One standard objection to award systems is that they
induce individuals to exert unproductive efforts to increase their chances of winning. Our result,
however, provides evidence to the contrary, as we observe an increase in productive effort.
Hence, even if some rent seeking is in progress, it does not come at the expense of productivity.
Third, we only measure the impact of the award subsequent to being presented. However, the
award system as such does have an incentive effect that, while it cannot be captured in this study,
probably has a substantial impact on the performance of all employees as they work towards
the award. In a field experiment, Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) find that the introduction of
an award system increases performance by about 10 percent.25
4 Conclusion
In general, the use of incentives is indispensable in principal-agent relationships within organi-
zations. Advances in behavioral economics have recently addressed and presented models of a
wide set of human motivations such as the desire for status and positive self-image. However,
awards as incentive instruments tapping a number of such motives have so far been neglected
in economics despite their widespread use in the corporate sector and elsewhere.
Using unique panel data from the call center of a Fortune 500 financial services provider,
this paper shows that receiving an award for uncontractible, voluntary work behaviors such as
organizing team events or substituting for sick employees increases core performance—those
efforts that are more immediately linked with business success by 7.5 percent when compared
to nonrecipients. Hence, we show in the field that awards have a sizeable and robust positive
25Receiving an award may also have other beneficial side effects that cannot be measured as part of this study.
For example, one might conjecture that awards have an additional positive effect on the retention rates of the award
winners.
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spillover effect on employee performance. Moreover, awards influence behavior after they have
been received, that is, beyond the incentive effect normally considered as people work towards
receiving the award.26 This clearly contradicts the notion that awards only influence behavior
due to their effect on future monetary income and that awards only reflect high ability and per-
formance but do not cause it. Additionally, awards have a positive spillover effect on dimensions
of the job that they do not target. The effect is short-lived and only occurs for first-time award
winners. The richness of the data set allows us to distinguish between different hypotheses that
could theoretically explain the effect. Examples include reciprocity and a change in employee
identification with the company. We conclude that our results are most consistent with the desire
to live up to the honor, which can be interpreted as one form of image-motivation.
This study is among the first to analyze formal recognition programs – awards – in the field.
There is much scope for future research. One important limitation of the study is that we cannot
observe performance in the rewarded task. Future research should address this issue as well as
whether managers can strategically exploit such spillover effects to incentivize, for example,
activities that are prone to motivation crowding out when incentivized directly.27 Another rel-
evant question concerns the optimal number of awards and award categories. Additionally, a
deeper understanding of all channels through which awards affect performance might improve
our understanding of incentive provision in principal-agent relationships.
26Hence, the documented ex-post performance enhancement adds to the presumably positive impact on the
awarded activity itself and the incentive effect of the award system per se.
27See, e.g., Frey 1997 and Be´nabou and Tirole 2003 on the crowding out of motivation.
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Number of agents
Winners 75 50%
Nonrecipients 75 50%
Total 150 100%
Number of observations
Winners 709 48%
Nonrecipients 771 52%
Total 1480 100%
without clean with clean
event windows event windows
Total awards in sample 137 60
Months covered 46 46
Average number of awards per month 2.98 1.30
Table II: Dimensions of Identification Strategy
Dimension Value Use
Time relative to event
Before bestowal of Gold Reward
(-1 to - 6 months) vs. after
bestowal of Gold Reward (+1 to
+ 6 months)
Allows testing whether the
performance of winners deviates from
the average performance prior to
winning.
Type of performance Core performance vs. behaviorsthat qualify for a Gold Rewarda
Ensures exogeneity of event (Gold
Reward) on our performance
measure.
Treatment Winner of Gold Reward vs.nonrecipient
Identification of the size of the effect of
a Gold Reward on core performance.
a The Gold Reward recognizes exceptional efforts that are unrelated to core call center duties. Examples
of behaviors that qualify for a Gold Reward are volunteering as a substitute during vacation times or
implementing team events.
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Table III: Impact of an Award on Performance (Six Months Before and After the Event)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All Obs Clean Event Windows Alternative Index
pi−6 0.037 −0.055 0.056
(0.046) (0.103) (0.085)
pi−5 0.092∗∗ 0.123 0.165∗
(0.041) (0.090) (0.091)
pi−4 0.053 0.100 0.144
(0.042) (0.071) (0.086)
pi−3 0.058 0.076 0.082
(0.062) (0.101) (0.105)
pi−2 0.008 −0.013 −0.037
(0.048) (0.097) (0.076)
pi−1 −0.016 −0.028 −0.087
(0.039) (0.071) (0.089)
pi0 0.000 −0.034 −0.078
(0.034) (0.068) (0.075)
pi+1 0.150
∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.188∗
(0.045) (0.086) (0.097)
pi+2 0.064 0.015 −0.067
(0.051) (0.124) (0.120)
pi+3 0.115 0.172 0.100
(0.097) (0.167) (0.155)
pi+4 0.009 −0.006 −0.020
(0.087) (0.108) (0.118)
pi+5 0.147
∗∗ −0.050 −0.050
(0.068) (0.059) (0.055)
pi+6 0.069 0.005 −0.061
(0.061) (0.108) (0.099)
Tenure 0.010 0.013 0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1480 1202 1202
R2 0.981 0.980 0.981
Fixed effect OLS regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
The dependent variable is a performance index between 1 (very poor) and 5 (very good) that ag-
gregates a call center agent’s performance in their 6 different performance dimensions (company
weights). pi−6 to pi+6 measure the period-specific spillover effects of receiving an award on perfor-
mance ranging from 6 months prior to an award to 6 months after the receipt of an award. Tenure
and Tenure2 account for the length of employment at the call center. Model1 includes all id-
month observations; Model2 uses clean event windows, i.e. only those id-month observations
where at most one of the winner dummies equals one to eliminate confounding effects; Model3
is based on Model2 and uses an index as dependent variable in which the different performance
dimensions are weighted equally. Standard errors are clustered on a workgroup per year level.
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Table IV: Effect of an award in the different performance dimensions
Index Quality After Call Calls taken Call Late Transfer
Worktime per hour Duration Rate
pi−6 −0.055 −0.222 0.055 0.186∗ 0.143 −0.011 0.183
(0.103) (0.177) (0.245) (0.093) (0.134) (0.191) (0.150)
pi−5 0.123 0.059 0.376 0.178 0.312∗∗ 0.019 0.046
(0.090) (0.132) (0.239) (0.142) (0.124) (0.115) (0.163)
pi−4 0.100 0.034 0.349∗ 0.219 0.229 −0.078 0.115
(0.071) (0.116) (0.197) (0.156) (0.156) (0.143) (0.234)
pi−3 0.076 0.068 0.118 0.152 0.061 −0.054 0.145
(0.101) (0.127) (0.241) (0.165) (0.156) (0.161) (0.265)
pi−2 −0.013 0.023 −0.281 0.090 0.147 −0.307∗ 0.110
(0.097) (0.168) (0.169) (0.155) (0.163) (0.160) (0.286)
pi−1 −0.028 0.061 −0.063 −0.043 −0.013 −0.403∗ −0.061
(0.071) (0.084) (0.193) (0.131) (0.158) (0.203) (0.270)
pi0 −0.034 0.030 −0.045 0.012 −0.028 −0.197 −0.237
(0.068) (0.081) (0.210) (0.123) (0.199) (0.327) (0.293)
pi+1 0.234
∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.445∗ 0.199 0.350 −0.038 −0.133
(0.086) (0.120) (0.249) (0.132) (0.238) (0.227) (0.194)
pi+2 0.015 0.139 −0.175 0.070 −0.084 −0.173 −0.178
(0.124) (0.168) (0.151) (0.200) (0.206) (0.203) (0.258)
pi+3 0.172 0.280 −0.129 0.050 0.130 −0.145 0.413
(0.167) (0.209) (0.296) (0.254) (0.218) (0.279) (0.307)
pi+4 −0.006 0.017 −0.243 −0.016 −0.141 −0.108 0.369
(0.108) (0.138) (0.281) (0.137) (0.183) (0.262) (0.283)
pi+5 −0.050 −0.049 −0.163 −0.106 −0.129 0.017 0.132
(0.059) (0.123) (0.221) (0.120) (0.204) (0.268) (0.374)
pi+6 0.005 0.104 −0.521∗∗ −0.054 −0.161 0.202 0.062
(0.108) (0.143) (0.201) (0.122) (0.150) (0.256) (0.400)
Tenure 0.013 0.017∗∗ −0.051∗∗ 0.024 0.035 0.029∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010) (0.016)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202
R2 0.980 0.949 0.923 0.956 0.949 0.902 0.905
Fixed-effect OLS regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The dependent variable is a performance index between 1 (very poor) and 5 (very good). Column 1 presents
the company index that aggregates a call center agent’s performance in their 6 different performance dimen-
sions (company weights). The other columns display the six different performance dimensions. pi−6 to pi+6
measure the period-specific spillover effects of receiving an award on performance ranging from 6 months
prior to an award to 6 months after the receipt of an award. Tenure and Tenure2 account for the length of
employment at the call center. The models use clean event windows, i.e. only those id-month observations
where at most one of the winner dummies equals one to eliminate confounding effects. Standard errors are
clustered on a workgroup per year level.
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Table V: Heterogeneity and Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All First Repeated Under- Over- With Month
Obs Award Awards performers performers Fixed effects
pi−6 0.037 0.001 0.100∗ −0.114 −0.006 −0.035
(0.80) (0.01) (1.78) (−0.61) (−0.04) (−0.33)
pi−5 0.092∗∗ 0.135 0.072 0.066 0.180 0.130
(2.22) (1.64) (0.97) (0.28) (1.62) (1.54)
pi−4 0.053 0.131 0.025 0.022 0.092 0.113
(1.27) (1.69) (0.37) (0.17) (1.08) (1.27)
pi−3 0.058 0.141 −0.003 −0.172 0.098 0.121
(0.93) (1.29) (−0.04) (−1.33) (0.71) (1.33)
pi−2 0.008 0.048 −0.017 −0.014 −0.012 0.020
(0.17) (0.50) (−0.30) (−0.07) (−0.10) (0.22)
pi−1 −0.016 −0.022 −0.033 −0.179 0.031 −0.024
(−0.42) (−0.29) (−0.79) (−0.95) (0.31) (−0.40)
pi0 0.000 −0.017 −0.006 −0.046 −0.019 −0.003
(0.01) (−0.22) (−0.09) (−0.40) (−0.26) (−0.04)
pi+1 0.150
∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.077 0.329∗∗ 0.129 0.280∗∗∗
(3.35) (2.99) (1.36) (2.53) (0.85) (3.21)
pi+2 0.064 0.056 0.056 −0.018 −0.011 0.053
(1.25) (0.47) (1.73) (−0.09) (−0.08) (0.48)
pi+3 0.115 0.193 0.062 0.525
∗ 0.030 0.172
(1.19) (1.04) (0.77) (2.02) (0.15) (1.06)
pi+4 0.009 0.062 −0.021 −0.001 −0.100 −0.016
(0.10) (0.55) (−0.24) (−0.01) (−0.98) (−0.16)
pi+5 0.147
∗∗ 0.022 0.194∗ −0.024 −0.145 −0.017
(2.16) (0.28) (2.02) (−0.31) (−1.12) (−0.24)
pi+6 0.069 0.126 0.030 0.175 −0.155 0.039
(1.14) (1.16) (0.43) (1.57) (−1.03) (0.31)
Tenure 0.010 0.018∗ 0.010 0.018∗∗ 0.014∗ −0.020
(1.41) (2.10) (1.15) (2.43) (2.10) (−0.73)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.97) (−1.62) (−0.45) (−1.21) (−0.44) (−0.85)
Observations 1480 1149 1015 898 775 1202
R2 0.981 0.980 0.981 0.979 0.985 0.981
Fixed-effect OLS regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The dependent variable is a performance index between 1 (very poor) and 5 (very good) that ag-
gregates a call center agent’s performance in their 6 different performance dimensions (company
weights). pi−6 to pi+6 measure the period-specific spillover effects of receiving an award on perfor-
mance ranging from 6 months prior to an award to 6 months after the receipt of an award. Tenure
and Tenure2 account for the length of employment at the call center. Column (1) includes all
id-month observations; Column (2) is restricted to observations with zero or one award, i.e. to in-
dividuals with one award maximum. Column (3) drop all observations for first time award winner,
i.e. it keeps individuals with zero or more than one award. Columns (4) and (5) report the results
for over- and underperformers separately. Column (4) only contains events, i.e. awards, where the
recipient performed below average in at least two out of the three months preceeding the award.
Column (5) contains all awards with above average or average performance of the individual prior
to winning. In both models, the reference group consists of all id-month observations that are not
part of any award window. Coliumn (6) adds month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on
a workgroup per year level. 29
Appendix
Figure A.1: Distribution of Gold Rewards per Employee
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Table A.1: Frequency of Gold Rewards per Month
Year Month Without Clean With Clean Difference
Event Windows Event Windows
2004 January 0 0 0
2004 February 4 3 1
2004 March 0 0 0
2004 April 0 0 0
2004 May 0 0 0
2004 June 0 0 0
2004 July 1 0 1
2004 August 4 2 2
2004 September 9 5 4
2004 October 4 2 2
2004 November 0 0 0
2004 December 4 0 4
2005 January 3 0 3
2005 February 1 0 1
2005 March 3 1 2
2005 April 1 0 1
2005 May 4 1 3
2005 June 4 4 0
2005 July 6 4 2
2005 August 4 2 2
2005 September 1 0 1
2005 October 1 0 1
2005 November 10 7 3
2005 December 6 3 3
2006 January 1 1 0
2006 February 0 0 0
2006 March 2 1 1
2006 April 1 0 1
2006 May 0 0 0
2006 June 3 1 2
2006 July 3 2 1
2006 August 4 1 3
2006 September 2 1 1
2006 October 2 0 2
2006 November 3 1 2
2006 December 8 5 3
2007 January 3 0 3
2007 February 5 1 4
2007 March 6 2 4
2007 April 4 2 2
2007 May 5 2 3
2007 June 1 1 0
2007 July 5 1 4
2007 August 4 2 2
2007 September 1 0 1
2007 October 4 2 2
Total 137 60 77
This Table presents the number of Gold Rewards per month. Column 3 presents the sample used
for the first model in the main regression Table III without clean event windows. The fourth
column presents the sample used in Models 2 and 3 in the main regression table (clean event
windows). With clean event windows, only those id-month observations are used in the analysis
where at most one of the winner dummies equals one to eliminate confounding effects.
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